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ADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE OF TRADE USAGE
One of the justifiable criticisms of our present juridical system is
that too often "the law is looked upon as a thing apart from life,
whereas, in truth and in reality, the law is a part of life. To vary the
preposition is to alter the entire point of view."'
There is a vital necessity of understanding the relation of law to
business, the effect of law upon business and of business upon law, and
the connection between these, on the one hand, and the prevalent social
and economic conditions in the community, on the other. The law
must be made to conform to the business and economic demands of the
community, as well as to the mores of the times. As also said, "it
should be a mirror to reflect the progress of society,"2 and must not be
unduly hobbled.
Perhaps nowhere in the law is the truth of these observations more
forcefully illustrated than in connection with the admissibility of evi-
dence of trade usage.
In a large number of the early decisions, evidence of trade usage or
custom was excluded, on the ground that its admission would involve
a violation of the parol evidence rule, and would tend to contradict and
vary the contract entered into between the parties.
Thus, in the very early New York case of Mutual Safety Insurance
Co. v. Hone, Receiver, etc.,3 the Court of Appeals, in rejecting evidence
of usage, said:
"The usage went to contradict the plain unequivocal language of the
policy and was therefore inadmissible."
Similarly, in the early case of Vail v. Rice,
4 it was held that a written
contract, definite and certain in its terms, could not be modified or
explained by proof of commercial usage.5
In other words, the doctrine of these early cases was that where a
contract between the parties is couched in simple language, free from
ambiguous or doubtful terms, the meaning of the contract could not be
evidenced by the admission of proof of any trade custom or usage.
Manifestly, these decisions were unfortunate in tendency and mis-
chievous in result. Instead of carrying out, they served to frustrate
the intention of the parties, for parties must always be assumed to have
contracted in the light of the trade meaning which attaches to certain
terms and with which it necessarily must be assumed they were
cognizant.
-,The True Function of Schools of Law," an address delivered by the writer
at the Bronx County Bar Association, June 8, 1923.
2Ibid.
'(1849) 2 N. Y. 235, 241.
'(1851) 5 N. Y. I55.
"See, also, Wadsworth v. Allcott (1851) 6 N. Y. 64, at p. 67; Bank of
Con -nerce v. Bissell (1878) 72 N. Y. 615.
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Where the words used are technical in nature, or where they have a
distinctive significance under the circumstances in which they are used,
it is now well settled that parol evidence ii admissible to show what their
meaning is.6 This rule should be, and by the better modern authority
now is, likewise applicable, where the words, although they have a com-
mon and popular meaning, have also acquired a peculiar meaning
between the parties to the contract by reason of the fact that such
meaning has become attached to the words by customary trade usage.
There are, however, only too numerous recent decisions which do
violence to and cannot be reconciled with the true doctrine.
rn the recent case of Rodgers v. Edward M. Rodrock Co.,
7 for
example, the Court of Errors and Appeals of New Jersey held, in an
action for breach of contract brought for failure to deliver bricks, that
there was no error in refusing to admit proof of a trade custom to
limit the amount of material required to be furnished by a specific con-
tract to the quantity of material necessary to complete the building
which the contractor was erecting. The learned court, by Mr. Justice
Bergen, said:
.... In other words, that a clear and unambiguous contract is sub-
ject to be modified by a trade custom in a particular locality. This
was properly excluded. The contract in express terms required the
delivery of a given number of bricks at a fixed price, and-'where
there is a contract, either by parol or in writing, its terms must fix the
rights of parties and it cannot be contradicted by proof of usage or
custom.' (Schenck v. Griffin, (1875) 38 N. J. Law, 462.)"
'
If the learned court intended to lay down as an invariable rule, which
it seems to have done, that evidence of trade custom is never admissible
to change the apparent or face meaning of a written contract, then its
decision is clearly contrary to sound principle and against the weight
of the better modern authority.
Where a written expression is ambiguous or the words used are
technical in nature or have a peculiar significance in connection with
the circumstances in which they are used, as we have seen, parol evi-
dence is admissible to show the true meaning of the words. The rea-
son is that the parol evidence rule is merely one which has been created
by a wise judicial policy to prevent parties, once they have entered into
a written contract, from trying to show that their agreement in fact was
'Collender v. Dinsnore (1873) 55 N. Y. 200, 205; Greenleaf, E%4dence (I6th
ed. 1899) sec. 295.
" (1923, N. J.) 120 Atl. i.
'See an editorial in N. Y. L. JouR. May 14, 1923. In connection with this
subject I wish to express my obligation to my assistant, Leonard Acker, Esq., who
made, with me, an exhaustive examination of the authorities upon this interesting
subject.
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different from the contract as written. But the rule in its correct inter-
pretation is riot intended to prevent the parties from showing the mean-
ing of the contract itself as written, so as to show what the real intent
expressed actually was.
For the same reason, therefore, that evidence is admitted to show
the meaning of technical words, evidence of trade custom is correctly
admitted to show the true meaning and the peculiar significance that
is attached to a trade term used between parties cognizant of the trade
custom. The reason is that the words, having acquired a certain pecu-
liar meaning between the parties because of this trade usage, to refuse
to admit the evidence of the usage, instead of upholding the contract as
it has been written, serves rather to defeat the expressed intention of
the parties, since it prevents them from showing what the real meaning
of the written words is.
The Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, First
Department, in the case of Schipper v. Milton,9 laid down the correct
rule, that "When a custom has been proved to exist, the mere fact that
it apparently varies the contract is not sufficient to exclude proof of the
custom, because it is impossible, without changing to some extent its
apparent effect, to add a material incident by showing that the words
are not employed in their usual meaning."
The Court of Appeals of New York, in Collender v. Dinsmore,0
had expressed, in slightly different language, the same rule, pointing out
that the mere fact that the word on its face had one meaning did not
prevent the admission of evidence of usage when such usage as between
the parties had given the word a meaning different from its ordinary
one.
Professor Williston frankly and soundly states, with characteristic
terseness, that the statement that usage is inadmissible to contradict the
plain meaning of a written contract, "is inconsistent with many deci-
sions and wrong on principle.""'
The United States Circuit Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, in
Nicoll v. Pittsvein,12 writing through judge Hough, recently correctly
pointed out the social reason and the true basis for the admission of
evidence of trade usage, stating that, "when tradesmen say or write
anything, they are, perhaps without any present thought on the subject,
writing on top of a mass of habits or usages which they take. as matter
of course. So (with Professor Williston) we think that anyone con-
tracting with knowledge of a usage will naturally say nothing about the
(1900) 5, App. Div. 522, 528, 64 N. Y. Supp. 935, 940.
"Supra note 6.
12 Williston, Contracts (i92o) sec. 65o; see, also, 5 Wigmore, Evidence (2d ed.
1923) sec. 244o.
I (192o) _69 Fed. 968, 97i, discussed and approved in (192) 30 YALE LAw
JOuRNAL, 761.
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matter unless desirous of excluding its operation; if he does wish to
exclude, he will say so in express terms."'3I
A few of the recent numerous cases which follow this correct doctrine,
that unless the parties have specifically in their writing excluded the
trade usage, they shall be deemed to 'have contracted and used the words
in the light of the trade usage, are illustrative of the effects of the
doctrine.
In Pucci v. Baney," the court held that where a contract provided for
excavation work at a certain rate per cubic yard, custom was admissible
to show that extra allowances were to be made to the excavators when
they had to excavate by necessity below the depth mentioned by the con-
tract.
In Brunald v. Glasser,'5 evidence was held correctly admitted to show
that a contractor was to be paid for laying bricks by reason of a trade
usage on a different basis than that apparently provided in the contract.
In Richardson & Co. v. Cornforth,'8 where the parties in their written
contract provided for the sale of oats that would test from thirty-six
to thirty-seven pounds a bushel, it was held that evidence was admissible
of a custom in the trade which showed that such an expression meant
oats that measured thirty-two pounds to the bushel.
In Burton v. Jennings," where a contract provided for the delivery
of lumber with "no waney" stocky it was held that evidence was admis-
sible to show that a certain percentage of "waney" lumber could be
tendered.
In Oswego Falls Pulp & Paper Co. v. Stecher Litho. Co.,' s where a
contract involved the delivery of cardboard of a certain grade, the Court
of Appeals of New York held that it was proper to admit evidence
showing a trade usage allowing the vendor to deliver paper varying in
grade and thickness from the exact terms of the written contract, saying:
".... in other words, to show that it was practically impossible to
have such a quantity of cardboard without a variation in some slight
degree. Such evidence is admissible, not for the purpose of contra-
dicting express terms of the contract, but rather to show a trade usage
and custom in the manufacture of goods. Newhall v. Appleton,
(1889) 114 N. Y. i4o; Whitney v. Hop Bitters Mfg. Co., (1888) 2
N. Y. Supp. 438, affirmed (189o) 121 N. Y. 682, 24 N. E. 1O98, i8
N. Y. St. Rep. 892." 19
"8 See Bentham, Rationale of Judicial Evidence (1827) Book IX, Part VI,
Ch. IV, 556, note, on this point.
' (1893, C. P. N. Y.) 2 Misc. 354, 21 N. Y. Supp. 1099.
1 (1898, Cty. Ct.) 25 Misc. 285, 53 N. Y. Supp. 1O2. But if the terms of the
contract preclude the assumption that the parties had the usage in mind it will not
be permitted to alter the plain meaning of the contract. North Shore Improvement
Co. v. N. Y. P. & N. R. Co. (ig2) i3o Va. 646, io8 S. E. ii.
(Igo2, C. C. A. 7th) II8 Fed. 325.
' (I911, C. C. A. 2d) i85 Fed. 382.
"(I915) 215 N. Y. 98, io8, iop N. E. 92, 95.
"Italics are mine.
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In the very recent case of Gumbinsky Bros. Company v. Smalley,
2"
the First Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court., affirming
Mr. Justice James O'Malley at Trial Term, New York County, held that,
where a contract provided for the delivery of paper "guaranteed free
from ground wood," evidence was admissible to show that under such
an expression there was a well-known trade usage allowing delivery of
paper containing a limited quantity of ground wood.
The doctrine which permits the admission of trade usage, where the
expression used is a trade expression, even though on its face the
expression is plain and unambiguous, it is submitted, is both sound and
wise, as well as conforming to the business demands and necessities of
the community. If, in fact, the parties who have entered into the
written contract are members of a certain trade, or cognizant of its
customs,2 ' and have used a trade term in their contract, then it seems
manifest that in using that term they used it with the meaning attached
to it by the trade usage. To shut out evidence of such trade usage, far
from sustaining the written contract, would only serve to defeat it, for
it would enforce between the parties a contract different in meaning than
that intended, since the parties contracting in the light of the trade usage
presumptively used the words with their special meaning in the trade,
and not in their ordinary meaning.
Such evidence of trade usage, therefore, unless the parties, in their
writing, have specifically shown that they intended to contract outside
of the usage, should always be admissible in order to show the true
meaning of the terms used in the contract.
The importance of observing this principle must be self-evident.
The narrow doctrine of the early cases tends to hamper business and
business men with the shackles of an unsound technicality. The more
recent and better doctrine conforms to the demands of business men,
satisfies the social, economic and financial demands of the community,
and, as by the writer said in another connection, is, therefore, sound law,
because "the law is simply a part of life itself, and must correspond to
the inexorable business, economic, social and ethical demands of the
community. ' 22 It is to the credit of the Federal and New York courts
rendering the above cited recent decisions on this subject, that they have
realized that the early cases, which run counter both to common sense
and to business demands, must be disregarded, and that they have,
accordingly, enunciated a less oppressive and more businesslike rule of
law, which corresponds with matured and thoughtful' commercial
sentiment. I. MVAURICE WORMSER
New York 
City
(1922) 2o3 App. Div. 661, 197 N. Y. Supp. 530, opinion per Mr. Justice
Greenbaum, affirmed .35 N. Y. 61g, 139 N. E. 758.
' Even where one party did not actually know of the usage it has been admitted.
See NoTEs (1922) 22 CoL L. REv. 741.
" See, supra, note I.
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TRANSMISSION OF MONEY AND SALE OF CREDIT
Within the United States one common method of effecting distant
payments is by drafts drawn upon correspondent banks.' From this
method two advantages over the use of the debtor's own check result:
the signature is known and can be honored at once; and payment can
be had by the creditor immediately without delay or deduction for collec-
tion. The drawing bank maintains balances with the banks of the larger
cities, replenishing any deficiencies in the exchanges by the transfer of
securities, or of credits at the Federal Reserve Bank, or by the occasional
shipment of coin ;2 and against payment to it by cash, checks, or other-
wise, it issues drafts upon its correspondents in favor of the payee
designated by the purchaser. Usually the drawing bank hands the
draft to the purchaser; and he remits it to the payee. Where the draft
is made to the purchaser's own order, and indorsed by him, few ques-
tions arise that are not covered in the usual law of bills of exchange.
When, however, the mercantile short cut is used, and the draft made to
the order of a fourth party named by the purchaser, the situation presents
more difficult problems; problems which are only slightly lessened by
the tendency of some courts to overlook their existence and treat the
transaction as if the purchaser were the named and indorsing payee.8
In Gellert v. Bank of California (1923, Or.) 214 Pac. 377, the pur-
chaser of drafts drawn by the defendant bank upon its New York
correspondent died without delivering them to the named payee. His
executor then presented the drafts to the defendant and asked that their
face amount be paid him. The court held (one judge dissenting) that
he could recover the face amount of the drafts.4 The legal relations
arising from such facts have been considered under various theories
according to the interpretation that courts have placed upon the
transaction.
If the purchase price is treated as a special deposit, a trust relation-
'United States Post Office orders, American Railway Express orders, bank
drafts, individual checks, small silver coins, and postage stamps are the mediums
commonly employed. See Holdsworth, Money and Banking (1914) sec. O9.
Practically no shipments of coin or paper money are made between individual
debtors and creditors, except those of silver coins for small debts.
'In most banks the outgoing and incoming out of town items balance. What-
ever shipments of coin and bank notes are made between banks for change are
not in payment of debts. For an explanation of domestic exchange see Harris,
Practical Banking (1915). The necessity for seasonal shipments of money to
move crops has been eliminated by the Federal Reserve System.
'Cf. Wright and Co. v. Ellis (1855, Ohio) I Handy, 546; Talbot v. Bank of
Rochester (841, N. Y. Sup. C.) I Hill, 295.
'It is to be observed that recovery of the $3 exchange charge, part of the
purchase price, was not allowed, indicating in some degree that the recovery was
not of money paid.
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ship is created,' and the money may be recovered by the purchaser under
the familiar doctrine that where one receives money from another for a
purpose which cannot be accomplished, or is abandoned, he becomes a
trustee of that fund.6 Substantially the same result is reached where
the drawer bank is treated as an agent, the purpose of the agency having
failed or become incapable of execution.
7  Since ordinary banking trans-
actions create the relation of debtor and creditor between the bank and
the customer, the weight of authority soundly holds that money given
for such a draft is not a special deposit and that no trust results."
When the transaction is termed a purchase and sale the difficulty is to
discover just what is the subject matter involved. It has been suggested
that the remitter purchases a negotiable instrument, and that the draw-
ing bank's obligation thereon is measured solely by the law applicable to
such instruments.9 But it is obvious that to talk of "sale" of the
drawer's executory contract, whether or not such contract be integrated
into a paper of particular effect, is a misleading use of terms. And even
considering the transaction as a sale, under the laws of negotiable instru-
ments has not the purchaser some rights other than the mere power of
vesting title in the payee? Concededly the purchaser's original inten-
tion was to vest title in the payee; but this may have become impossible
by the payee's refusal to receive it, or by the death of the purchaser as
in the instant case. Does the purchaser then have no remedy? And
if a remedy is open in such cases, is it not equally open where some
'Ryan v. Phillips (1896) 3 Kan. App. 704, 44 Pac. gog; Carlson v. Kies (1913)
75 Wash. 171, 134 Pac. 8o8; 16 A.L.R. 19o, note; Stone, Somw Problems
Involved in the Transmission of Funds (1921) 25 CoL. L. REV. 507, notes 9 and o.
'St. Louis v. Johnson (1879, C.C. 8th) 5 Dill. 241; Atlantic Comn-nication
Co. v. Zimmerman (1918) 182 App. Div. 862, 57o N. Y. Supp. 275; Legniti v.
Mechanics and Metals Bank (1919) 186 App. Div. 105, 173 N. Y. Supp. 814,
but reversed in 23o N. Y. 415, 13o N. E. 596; 4 L. R. A. 328, note; NOms (1919)
19 COL. L. REV. 322.
'McGorray v. Stockton, Loan Assn. (i9O1) 13, Calif. 321, 63 Pac. 479; cf.
Safian v. Irving National Bank (1922) :02 App. Div. 459, 196 N. Y. Supp. 141.
'Clark v. Toronto Bank (1905) 72 Kan. 1, 82 Pac. 582; Spiroplos v. Scandi-
navian Bank (1921) 116 Wash. 495, 199 Pac. 997; Harrison v. Wright (1884)
1oo Ind. 515; American Express Co. v. Cosnwpolitan Trust Co. (1921) 239 Mass.
249, 132 N. E. 26; Louisville Banking Co. v. Paine (189o) 67 Miss. 678, 7 So.
462; Grammel v. Carmer (1884) 55 Mich. 201, 21 . W. 458. A trust is created
if the drawing bank knows it is insolvent at the time it issues the draft. Whit-
comib v. Carpenter (1907) 134 Iowa, 227, 111 N. W. 825; Widinan v. Kellogg
(1911) 22 N. D. 396, 133 N. W. lO2O; io L. R. A. (xi. s.) 928, note. But this
is the case also with the receipt of general deposits under those circumstances.
* See Foreign Trade Corporation v. Cosmopolitan Trust Co. (1922) 240 Mass.
413, 134 N. E. 403; COMMsENTS (1918) 28 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 695, note I6.
...... foreign exchange or credit is a subject of purchase and sale, and not only
may be, but is commonly contracted for in the same manner and governed by the
same laws as in the case of purchase of wheat, cotton, or any other subject of
commerce." Dissenting opinion by Judge Shean in Legniti v. Mechanics and
Metals Bank, supra note 6, at p. 1II, 173 N. Y. Supp. at p. 819.
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supervening fact leads the purchaser to change his mind? The cases
seem so to hold,"0 a rule hardly consonant with the law of sales of
chattels. Another objection to the sale theory is that an oral contract
for the delivery of such drafts would seem to be not within the Statute
of Frauds."
Another possibility is to regard the transaction as an assignment to the
payee of the amount of the draft. This view would necessarily deny a
recovery by the purchaser. But if the payee's rights are conditioned
upon delivery to him such an interpretation is unsound.1 2  Or if it be
regarded as an assignment to the purchaser of the draft, his right would
be against the drawee, not against the drawer. But the Negotiable
Instruments Law provides that a bill of exchange does not, of itself,
operate as an assignment of the funds deposited with the drawee.13
And by the weight of authority, even the drawer's supervening insol-
vency effects no assignment of the funds upon deposit.' 4 The parties
"0 Recovery by the purchaser was allowed in Lime Rock Bank v. Macomber
(1849) 29 Me. 564 (promissory note); Bank of Natchez v. Claiborne (1840,
Miss.) 5 How. 3o (same); Hunt v. Aldrich (1853) 27 N. H. 31 (same);
Bank of Chenago v. Hyde (1825, N. Y. Sup. Ct.) 4 Cowen. 567 (same); Bull v.
Latimer (19o4, Tex. Civ. App.) So S. W. 252 (same); Planters' Bank v. Blair
(1843) 4 Ala. 613 (same); Rhyan v. Dunnigan (i881) 76 Ind. 178 (same);
Ward v. Northern Bank (1853, Ky.) 14 B. Mon. 283 (same); Pfotenhauer v.
Equitable Trust Co. (1921, Sup. Ct.) 188 N. Y. Supp. 464 (draft) ; Plischner v.
Taylor (1922, Mun. Ct) 193 N. Y. Supp. 236 (same); Chemical National Bank
v. Equitable Trust Co. (1922) 2O App. Div. 485, 194 N. Y. Supp. 177 (same);
Wasserinan v. Irving National Bank (1921, Mun. Ct.) 114 Misc. 704, i87 N. Y.
Supp. 243 (wireless transfer); Western Union v. Lapenna: (1922, Ind. App.)
133 N. E. 1t44 (telegraph transfer) ; Stern v. Barrett (1922, Sup. Ct.) 195 N. Y.
Supp. i6o. Recovery was denied in Goeske v. Taylor (1923, Sup. Ct.) 199 N. Y.
Supp. 577 (draft where statute as to lost instruments not complied with);
Grossman v. Zaro (1922, Sup. Ct.) 119 Misc. 713, 197 N. Y. Supp. 305 (draft-
presentment to drawee not shown) ; Foreign Trade Corp. v. Cosmopolitan Trust
Co. (1922) 24o Mass. 413, 134 N. E. 403 (sale of draft) ; Alemian v. American
Express Co. (1921) 237 Mass. 58o, 23o N. E. 253 (letter transfer-drawer's
contract completed); Nicoletti v. Bank of Los Banos (1923, Calif.) 224 Pac.
5I (same) ; Lemon v. First National Bank (1923, Calif.) 216 Pac. 62o (draft-
investment) ;' Rosenblatt v. Josephsohn (igi8, Sup. Ct.) 172 N. Y. Supp. 719
(letter transfer-action prematurely brought). For cases showing the right of
a special depositor for the purposes of transmission to recover, see Stone, op. cit.
supra note 5, nt p. 524, note 66.
'Cf. Equitable Trust Co. v. Keene (1922) 232 N. Y. 290, 133 N. E. 894 (cable
transfer). A contract for the creation of a draft can hardly be regarded as a
"sale of a thing in action" within the Uniform Sales Act, sec. 4 (1). A sale
implies the existence of the thing sold before transfer of title. Cf. sec. 76.
"Stone, op. cit. supra note 5, at p. 524.
'Sec. 127; cf. also sec. i89.
"Dickinson v. Coates (1883) 79 Mo. 250; Grammel v. Carmer, supra note 8;
Clark v. Toronto Bank, supra note 8; Lummus Cotton Gin Co. v. Walker (1916)
195 Ala. 552, 70 So. 754; People v. Merchants' Bank (1879) 78 N. Y. 269; contra:
First National Bank v. Coates (i881, W. D. Mo.) 8 Fed. 540. A preference is
allowed if the drawing bank knew it was insolvent when it issued the draft.
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may, of course, by the employment of appropriate language effect an
assignment.15 In such a case the drawee would become liable to the
payee to the extent of the funds then on deposit, subject, of course, to
the rules on notice. But such language is not common in case of remit-
tance drafts,18 and it is generally held that the mere issuance of a draft
by a bank upon its correspondent is not an assignment of the funds
upon deposit. 7
The transaction may also be treated as an executory contract to estab-
lish credit for the benefit of, or procure payment to a third party,
although this view seems confined to transfers of credit, and contracts
for payment which are not evidenced by and integrated into drafts
delivered to the purchaser. A so-called "draft" forwarded by the
drawing bank to the drawee stands on obviously different footing as a
mere memorandum. In these cases the ordinary contract rule that
rescission is not allowed after notice to the beneficiary has not been
followed, and the purchaser seems to have been allowed to rescind until
the funds have been delivered to the payee.' 8 Often, especially in inter-
national banking, the process is simplified, the purchaser and payee
being one. And in the cases so far decided, no conflicting claims of a
complaining payee seem to have been urged. It is not easy to say how
far such urging may produce a modification of the rules.
Finally the transaction may be treated as an executory contract to pay
money, integrated into a draft, but reserving to the purchaser a power
to return the draft and secure its face value; a power not apparent
from the face of the instrument, but implied in fact on the basis of
business practice and understanding. This seems to be the only sound
interpretation of the instant case. Professor Underhill Moore urges
Whitcomb v. Carpenter (1907) 134 Iowa, 227, ii N. W. 825; Stoller v. Coates
(1886) 88 Mo. 514.
'Fourth Street Bank v. Yardley (1896) I65 U. S. 634, 17 Sup. Ct. 439;
Brannan, Negotiable Instruments Law (3d ed. 1920) 407.
"' Many printed blank checks provided by merchants for their customers con-
tain this phrase: "I hereby represent that I have this amount on deposit in the
above bank and subject to this check which amount is hereby assigned to the payee
or holder hereof." The effect of this provision seems not to have been judicially
determined. Several possibilities are suggested: (i) The instrument may be
both a negotiable instrument and an assignment and the holder of it may determine
which it will be by electing his remedy. (2) It may be a negotiable instrument
only, the attempted assignment failing for want of certainty as to the assignee.
(3) Or it may be an assignment only, the added provisions rendering the check
non-negotiable within the meaning of sections I (2) and 3 of the Negotiable
Instruments Law.
" Florence Mining Co. v. Brown (1887) 124 U. S. 385, 8 Sup Ct. 531; Fulton v.
Gesterding (19o4) 47 Fla. 15o, 36 So. 56; Hanna v. McCrory (1914) ig N. M.
183, 141 Pac. 996; Brannan, op. cit. supra note 15, at p. 356.
" Carpenter v. Sparta Savings Bank (1920, Sup. Ct) i8z N. Y. Supp. 172;
see Meador v. Rudolph (I92O, Tex. Civ. App.) 218 S. W. 52o (deposit); Graven-
horst v. Zimmerman (x923) 236 N. Y. 22 (wireless transfer).
COMMENTS
that there is a true condition implied in law 1-- that if the purchaser
does not want to use the draft he may return it and secure the face of
the instrument. Professor Chafee declares that the true theory of
recovery is in quasi-contract to the extent of the unjust enrichment.
20
In the instant case the Oregon court avoided choosing a theory of
recovery, saying, "Whether the purchase of the draft created the rela-
tion of principal and agent for the transmission of funds, or amounted
to a contract for the sale of credit, under a well established rule, money
paid for a purpose which cannot be accomplished because of a subse-
quently intervening obstacle may be recovered."
In commercial practice banks which have sold drafts payable to another,
even in the absence of "an intervening obstacle," have usually refunded
the face amount of the instrument to the purchaser if he has chosen to
return it. The drawing bank has made its profit from the transaction
and it should be immaterial to the bank whether it pays the named payee,
or a third party, provided that the payment will discharge its duty.?'
The drawer has been protected where it refunded to the purchaser upon
surrender of the instrument,2 2 and the purchaser's power to compel the
bank to pay has also been established.23  There is a practical banking
difficulty, in that if drafts can be returned at the will of the purchaser,
the drawing bank must maintain funds both at its place of business
and with the drawee bank. If this is an onerous burden, not included
in the original charge, it should be added to the cost of the draft or
deducted from the amount refunded. Actually it seems to be mostly
a question of bookkeeping and the adjustment of interest charges not
involving any considerable sum.
A related problem concerns the payee's rights where the purchaser
seeks to return the draft. Several situations are possible: (i) If the
payee is rightfully in possession by proper delivery it seems that the
" "Is not the remitter's claim equitable? No, his remedy is in assumpsit.
Surely equitable in origin? There is not a trace of it in the books. Is it not
merely a quasi-contractual claim for restitution of the consideration? No, it is
for the payment of the face at the time and place of payment; the action is
assumpsit on the instrument. But is not the claim really quasi-contractual; have
not the courts in attempting to give restitution simply slipped into error as to the
measure of damages? No trace of this slip marks the opinions which are unusually
realistic." Moore, Right of Remitter of a Bill (192o) 20 CoL. L. REv. 749, 753.
"An action for money had and received was the only proper remedy." Chafee,
Progress of the Law: Bills and Notes (91) 33 HARv. L. REv. 255, 264. And
see Elliot v. Abbot (1841) 12 N. H. 549, 555. Compare note ;f, supra.
" Moore, op. cit. supra note 18, at p. 753. "The principle is this, that when a
note is made to raise money [a draft is issued to transmit money], it does not
change the liabilities of the parties to the note [draft) that the money is advanced
[that the draft is presented] by a third person instead of the.payee." Eastman, r.,
in Hunt v. Aldrich, supra note IO, at p. 36.
'Buehler v. Galt (1889) 35 Ill. App. 225.
Garthwaite v. Bank of Tulare (19Ol) 134 Calif. 237, 66 Pac. 326; see also
cases cited in note 1o, supra.
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function of the instrument has been fulfilled; that the purchaser has no
rights against the drawer; and that the payee could hold the drawer in
event of dishonor by the drawee. Furthermore the purchaser could not
effectually destroy the payee's rights by inducing the drawer to stop
payment.2 4  If the purchaser subsequently gains possession of the
instrument fraudulently the bank would not be protected in paying
him.2 5  Even those cases which hold that a payee cannot ordinarily
become a holder in due course seem to agree that in this case he may.
But if the payee voluntarily relinquishes possession to the purchaser
without endorsing, he apparently relinquishes his rights on the instru-
ment and the purchaser's rights are the same as if there had been no
delivery.20  (2) If the payee has come wrongfully into possession pay-
ment to him by the drawee would discharge the drawer's liability to the
purchaser.27  Should the purchaser intervene before payment had been
made to the payee the drawer could defend a suit by the payee upon the
grounds of no delivery.28 (3) If the payee has never been in posses-
sion he would have no rights unless the theory of assignment should be
adopted . 2  And even under such a theory, the rule should be that the
"Canterbury v. Bank of Sparta (1895) 9I Wis. 53, 64 N. W. 311 (draft);
Bobrick v. Second National Bank (1916) 175 App. Div. 550, i62 N. Y. Supp.
147 (draft); Freund v. Importers' and Traders' Bank (1879) 76 N. Y. 352
(certified check) ; Merchants' Bank v. New First National Bank (1917) I16 Ark.
i, i7o S. W. 852. But the drawee is, of course, under a duty to the drawer not to
pay after notice of stoppage is given. Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Louissell
(1914) ii Ala. App. 563, 66 So. 839.
"It seems that the payee can hold the drawer, as he can sue the drawee in
trover for the conversion of the draft, where the drawee has paid a fraudulent
holder. Ellery v. People's Bank (199o, Sup. Ct.) 114 N. Y. Supp. io8 (face
amount with interest recovered) ; Burstein v. People's Trust Co. (91) 143 App.
Div. I65, 127 N. Y. Supp. 1092 (face amount with interest recovered) ; Kansas
City Co. v. Westport Bank (1915) 19I Mo. App. 287, 177 S. W. 1092 (face amount
recovered); Graves v. American Exchange Bank (I858) 17 N. Y. 2o5 (face
amount recovered). But not in assumpsit for money had and received. B~altimore
Ry. v. First National Bank (19o4) 1O2 Va. 753, 47 S. E. 837. Nor in an action
on the check. Elyria Savings Co. v. Walker C&. (1915) 92 Ohio St. 406, iI1
N. E. 147.
' See cases supra note 3.
"Schaeffer v. Marsh (1915, Sup. Ct.) 90 Misc. 307, 153 N. Y. Supp. 96;
Boston Steel Co. v. Steuer (1903) 183 Mass. 14o, 66 N. E. 646; see Colonial
Fur Co. v. First National Bank (1917) 227 Mass. 12, 116 N. E. 731; Bergstrom
v. Ritz-Carlton Co. (1916) 171 App. Div. 776, 154 N. Y. Supp. 959. The payee
can be a holder in due course. Herdman, v. Wheeler [i9o2] i K. B. 361; Liberty
Trust Co. v. Tilton (1914) 217 Mass. 462, lO5 N. E. 605; contra: Vander Ploeg v.
Van Zook (19o7) 135 Iowa, 350, 112 N. W. 807.
"Lack of delivery or conditional delivery may be shown as a defense against
the payee. Seattle National Bank v. Becker (1913) 74 Wash. 431, 133 Pac. 613;
In re Continental Engine Co. (1916, C. C. A. 7th) 234 Fed. 58. Parol evidence
may be used to show such conditional delivery. Norman v. McCarthy (914) 56
Colo. 290, 138 Pac. 28
"Carpenter v. Sparta Savings Bank (1920, Sup. Ct) 182 -N. Y. Supp. 172;
Buehler v. Galt, supra note 22; Stone, op. cit. supra note 5, at p. 524.
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assignment is accomplished by the delivery of the instrument and not
by its issuance.30
In all of these cases it is intended that the drawer shall pay but once.
But the drawer in paying the purchaser can seldom be positive that the
payee has acquired no rights by prior delivery; especially where the
payee is in another city. A practical solution of that problem would be
afforded by compelling the purchaser who obtains reimbursement to
indemnify the drawer against a successful suit by the payee. Even
determination in a suit at law that no delivery had been made would not
be res judicata against a payee.
In the field of foreign exchange the drawing bank agrees to ship gold,
silver, or paper money to the named payee; or to draw upon existing
credits with a foreign correspondent; or to have such foreign credits
made available; or to make payment to a designated party.31 At present
little gold is being shipped out of the United States and practically all
transfers are of credit, accomplished by letter, cable, and wireless teleg-
raphy. In rare cases, more frequent in foreign than in domestic
transfers, where the transaction contemplated is the shipment of specific
gold, silver, or bank notes, either deposited by the remitter, or specifi-
cally appropriated to the contract by the transmitter, the bank or other
transmitter becomes a bailee and holds the specific funds as a fiduciary. 2
More usually the transaction contemplates a transfer of credit and is
held to be either a purchase and sale of foreign credit or a contract to
perform a service, and as in domestic transfers, no trust relationship
between the purchaser and drawer is established.33 So where the value
of foreign credit has diminished and payment to the payee has become
impossible, the purchaser is entitled, not to the sum he paid, but to the
value of the undelivered credit at the time delivery could reasonably
have been discovered to be impossible. Indeed, the only vital distinction
'But see contra: Morris v. Bank of Pittsburgh (1923, Pa.) 120 Atl. 698.
Kniffin, Practical Workings of a Bank (4th ed. 1917) 587; Holdsworth,
Money and Banking (914) sec. iog. Observe the distinction between remit and
pay: the former connotes the duty of sending forward and making available,
while the latter includes the duty of hunting up the designated payee. Nicoletti v.
Bank of Los Banos (1923, Calif.) 234 Pac. 51; Alemian v. American Express
Co. (1921) 237 Mass. 58o, I3o N. E. 253. So, too, the transaction may be con-
sidered as an investment in foreign money. Lemon v. First National Bank (1923,
Calif.) 216 Pac. 620. In that case no payment to a beneficiary was expected,
and the contract was made unusually explicit.
"Musco v. United Surety Co. (igog) 132 App. Div. 300, 117 N. Y. Supp. 21.
And the transmitter is guilty of larceny if he misappropriates such fiduciary funds.
People, ex rel. Zotti, v. Flynn (19o9) 135 App. Div. 276, io N. Y. Supp. 511.
' American Express Co. v. Cosmopolitan Trust Co. (1921) 239 Mass. 249, 132
N. E. 26; Legniti v. Mechanics and Metals Bank, supra note 6; NOTES (1919)
i9 COL. L. REv. 322; COMMENTS (1921) 31 YALE LAW JouRNAL, 416.
"Fliker v. State Bank (1916, Mun. Ct.) 94 Misc. 6o9, 159 N. Y. Supp. 73o;
Katcher v. Anmerican Express Co. (1920) 94 N. J. L. I65, iog Atl. 74i;
Oshinsky v. Taylor (1918, Sup. Ct.) 172 N. Y. Supp. 233; Kartzeborn v. Liberty
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between foreign and domestic transactions is that foreign remittances
are normally translated into another medium of payment, whose
exchange relation with our own varies. That fact, however, should not
obscure the basic identity of the two transactions. As in domestic
transfers, the money paid for the draft or contract becomes the property
of the drawer, and no preference is allowed to the purchaser in case of
the drawer's insolvency35
The effect of one point of banking practice found in the instant case
still requires discussion: the drawee was advised of the drawing of the
draft by the drawer, and the drawee's account credited. In foreign
transactions the selling banks almost universally advise their corres-
pondents of the drafts drawn, and the correspondent debits the drawer
at once upon receipt of the advice of drawing instead of upon the ulti-
mate payment of the draft.
38 In domestic transfers the practice of
forwarding notice is not general; it is hardly used at all and when used
is to prevent alterations or impersonations.
3 7 The account is charged
only upon actual payment. It is, therefore, to be expected that the court
gave the advice no effect of assigning the drawer's credit with the
drawee; and that the provisional book entries were likewise dealt with.
This view is sound, and suggests that the same result should follow in
foreign banking practice, even though the entries after notice received
have been made on the books of both the drawer 
and drawee.3 8
Bank (1923, Mo. App.) 253 S. W. 103; Carmen v. Higginson (1923, Mass.) 140
N. E. 246; Safian v. Irving National Bank, supra note 7. The amount paid
may be recovered when drawer is negligent. But the drawing bank is .not liable
for the failure of the cable company to transmit the order. Strohmeyer & Co. 
v.
Guaranty Trust Co. (1916) 172 App. Div. 16, 157 N. Y. Supp. 955; cf. Aleman v.
American Express Co., supra note IO; (1923) 32 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 179.
' Taussig v. Carnegie Trust Co. (1913) 156 App. Div. 519, 141 N. Y. Supp.
347, affirned 213 N. Y. 627, lO7 N. E. io86; Beecher v. Cosmopolitanr 
Trust Co.
(1921) 239 Mass. 48, 131 N. E. 338. But cQntra, if the parties have contracted
for a special deposit. Drovers' Bank v. O'Hare (1887) 119 Ill. 646, IO N. E. 
36o;
Cutler v. American Exchange Bank (1889) 113 N. Y. 593, 21 N. E. 710.
So common is the practice that drawee banks usually refuse to pay drafts
which have not been advised. Barrett, Modern Banking Methods (19o2) 235.
This precaution perhaps reflects the state of the law where payment over 
a forged
indorsement, and perhaps, of a raised instrument, can be charged to the drawer's
account if made in due course of business. And where the practice of 
"indirect
drawing" is used, whereby a metropolitan bank permits its domesticr correspondent
out of courtesy, or for a consideration, to draw directly upon the metropolitan
bank's foreign balances, the draft can obviously be honored only after receipt 
of the
advices which give the drawee their only guaranty of genuineness. Observe, too,
that indirect drawing may work the other way permitting foreign banks to 
draw
directly against their New York bank's interior correspondents.
N otice of the drawing and of the purpose thereof seem, however, to be
customary where the payee named is another bank; at least, where such payee 
is
a correspondent of the drawer. This fact should bear on the determination 
of
whether the payee cashing such an instrument for a stranger is a holder 
in
due course.
' Such entries relate only to the regulation of interest; the parties regard
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STATE STATUTES LIMITING EXPORT OF NATURAL RESOURCES
Once again an alarmed state legislaiure, viewing with anxiety the
ever more rapid exhaustion of the state natural gas fields, has exerted
its law-making ingenuity1 in a vain effort to preserve for its own
constituents3 what remains of the precious commodity. A recent West
Virginia statute required all producers of natural gas to supply local
consumers to the extent of their demand before supplying any con-
sumers outside the state.4 The two states most affected by this change
stopping payment of such advised drafts as perfectly proper. And while by the
law, e. g. of France, the draft works an assignment pro tanto of the balance if
the drawer later becomes insolvent, the N. I. L. would seem to settle the case
to the contrary in this country.
'It was thought that the statute here involved might be sustained as a mere
regulation of a public utility. Some of its exponents, before the passage of
the act, said: "The question here is, not whether a state may prohibit or restrict
the transportation of natural gas from its territory into another state, but
whether the state nay require companies-owing to its people the obligation of
adequate service-to perform that service, even though the performance may
involve the intrastate consumption of gas which otherwise might be transported
to another state." Steptoe and Hoffheimer, Legislative Regulations of Natural
Gas Supply it West Virginia (1918) 25 W. VA. L. QUART. 257, 271. The same
point was also urged ia an article by Hardman, Exportation of Natural Resources
(1919) 26 W. VA. L. QUART. i. The opinion in the instant case replies to the
argument by saying that the business is also a public utility in Ohio and Pennsyl-
vania. But, at any rate, if the statute in fact effects too great a control of
interstate commerce, the particular power of the state under which it is passed
seems immaterial. See infra note 2.
2Ever since the value and the limited extent of this natural resource have
been appreciated, states enjoying gas fields within their territories have invoked
almost all the possible state powers in attempts to restrict the export of gas.
(i) Power of Eminent Domain. Statutes denying the use of state highways
for the pipes of corporations transmitting natural gas outside the state have been
held unconstitutional. Manufacturers' Gas Co. v. Indiana Natural Gas Co.
(19oo) 155 Ind. 545, 58 N. E. 706; West v. Kansas Nat. Gas. Co. (1911) 22x
U. S. 229, 31 Sup. Ct 564; Haskell v. Kansas Nat. Gas Co. (1912) 224 U. S.
217, 32 Sup. Ct 442. (2) Police Power. Statutes forbidding gas to enter pipes
under a pressure of more than 300 pounds and forbidding the use of artificial
pumps along the way have been held unconstitutional. Benedict v. Columbus
Construction Co. (1892) 49 N. J. Eq. 23, 23 Atl. 485; Manufacturers Gas Co. v.
Indiana Gas Co. (19oo) 155 Ind. 566, 58 N. E. 851; Haskell v. Kansas Nat.
Gas Co., supra. A statute similar except that artificial maintenance of the
prescribed pressure along the pipe line was not forbidden was upheld as a
bona fide police regulation. Jamieson v. Indiana Nat. Gas Co. (i8gi) 128 Ind.
555, 28 N. E. 76. (3) Taxing Power. A statute imposing a tax on petroleum
transported in pipe lines has been held to be invalid as a regulation of interstate
commerce. Eureka Pipe Line Co. v. Hallanan (921) 257 U. S. 265, 42 Sup.
Ct. 101; United Fuel Gas Co. v. Hallanan (1921) 257 U. S. 277, 42 Sup. Ct. 105.
'The statute was enacted February xo, 199; Barnes' Ann. W. Va. Code, 1923,
ch. 15 0, secs. 29, 30.
"For a history of the circumstances leading to the adoption of the statute see
an article by Steptoe and Hoffheimer, op. cit. supra note I.
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in policy promptly brought suit for an injunction to restrain the enforce-
ment of the statute,5 and in the twin cases of Pennsylvania v. West
Virginia and Ohio v. West Virgina (1923) 43 Sup. Ct. 658, the
Supreme Court of the United States granted the injunction and
declared the statute in conflict with the interstate commerce clause of
the federal constitution. 6
While a state may never impose directly or indirectly any serious
burden on interstate commerce as such,7 yet in its control of public
welfare and of business enterprise within its territorial jurisdiction,
regulation of trade between the states is necessarily involved, and is
permitted to some degree.8 The limitations on the power of the state
An interlocutory injunction was granted and remained in force until the per-
manent injunction was granted by the decision of the instant case.
'Mr. Justice Holmes, Mr. Justice McReynolds and Mr. Justice Brandeis
dissented, the last two largely on the ground that the court lacked jurisdiction
because this was not a justiciable controversy between states within the Judiciary
Article of the Constitution. There seems to be ample authority for the proposi-
tion that a state may sue in behalf of her citizens where the welfare of a large
number of them is involved in the question. Kansas v. Colorado (192o) 185
U. S. 125, 22 Sup. Ct. 552; Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co. (i9o7) 2o6 U. S.
23o, 27 Sup. Ct. 618; Hudson County Water Co. v. McCarter (19o8) 209 U. S.
349, 28 Sup. Ct. 529. In this case, furthermore, it seems that the interest of the
complainant states as proprietors of public institutions using natural gas is
sufficient to enable them to maintain the suits.
'The United States Supreme Court has made a convenient collection of cases
in support of the following propositions: ". ... States cannot tax interstate
commerce, either by laying the tax upon the business which constitutes such
commerce or the privilege of engaging in it, or upon the receipts as such derived
from it; or upon persons or property in transit in interstate commerce ....
They have no power to prohibit interstate trade in legitimate articles of commerce;
or to discriminate against the products of other States; .... or to prescribe
the rates to be charged for transportation from one State to another, or to
subject the operations of carriers in the course of such transportation to require-
ments that are unreasonable or pass beyond the bounds of suitable local protec-
tion." Minnesota Rate Cases (1913) 230 U. S. 352, 400, 33 Sup. Ct. 729, 740.
' Statutes were held valid in the following cases: Silt v. Hesterberg (19o8)
211 U. S. 31, 29 Sup. Ct. io (prohibiting possession of game during closed season
whether imported or not); Manufacturers' Light and Heat Co. v. Ott (19.14,
N. D. W. Va.) 215 Fed. 94o (fixing rates for natural gas sold within state,
including imported gas); Hump Hairpin Mfg. Co. v. Emmerson (1922) 258
U. S. 29o, 42 Sup. Ct. 305 (taxation of sales); Hebe Co. v. Calvert (1917, S. D.
Ohio) 246 Fed. 7ii (prohibiting the manufacture and sale of condensed milk
made from skimmed milk). See (1918) 31 HARv. L. REV. 1031. Cf. United
Mine Workers of America v. Coronado Coal Co. (1921) 259 U. S. 344, 42 Sup.
Ct. 570. The seriousness of the interference with interstate commerce, always
a question of degree, is the triterion by which the court tests the validity of a
statute. Lemke v. Farmers' Grain Co. of Embden (1922) 258 U. S. 5o, 42 Sup.
Ct: 244; Chicago & N. W. Ry. v. Railroad and Warehouse Commission (1922,
D. Minn.) 28o Fed. 387; Interstate Motor Transit Co. v. Kuykendall (1922, W. D.
Wash.) 284 Fed. 882; (1921) 34 HARV. L. REv. 333; (1921) 35 ibid. 89; (1922)
35 ibid. 62o, 883. See Powell, The Supreme Court's Construction of the Federal
Constitution in 1920-2 , II Regulation of Commerce (1921) 20 MIcI. L. REV.
135, 140.
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are perhaps best illustrated in the cases involving legislation for the
exclusion from state boundaries of commodities believed to be injurious
to public health. Thus every endeavor of the states to enforce local
prohibition laws to prevent the importation of intoxicating liquors from
other states was held to contravene the interstate commerce clause,"
until a federal statute finally came to the aid of the states and accom-
plished the desired result.10  The struggle to keep diseased cattle and
adulterated foods beyond state bounds has resulted in another series of
cases in which only the very narrowest statutes directed against cattle
known to be diseased or-foods known to be adulterated have been
sustained, and only on the ground that such cattle or food were not
properly subjects of interstate commerce at all."'
In the control by the state over its exports, however, there has been
a tendency to allow greater power to the state to legislate with respect
to its natural resources than to other products. Tonnage and occupa-
tion taxes have been sustained in the coal and iron mining industry
2
and a state has been allowed to prohibit entirely the exportation of its
fresh waters.' 3  In Geer v. Connecticut,'" a statute directly prohibiting
the exportation of game killed within the state was sustained on the
' Bowman v. Chicago & Northwestern Ry. (888) 125 U. S. 465, 8 Sup. Ct. 689;
Leisy v. Hardin (i8go) 135 U. S. xoo, io Sup. Ct. 681; Vance v. Vandercook Co.
"(198) 17o U. S. 438, 18 Sup. Ct. 674; Louisville & N. R. R. v. Coal Brewing Co.
(912) 223 U. S. 70, 32 Sup. Ct '89.
",Act of Mar. 1, 1913 (37 Stat. at L. 699).
' Statutes prohibiting the importation of sheep or cattle during certain seasons
from districts where disease is known to be prevalent have been held void.
R. R. v. Husen (1877) 95 U. S. 465; Grimes v. Eddy (1894) 126 Mo. 168, 28
S. W. 756. So also with a statute prohibiting the importation of all oleomar-
garine. Schollenberger v. Pennsylvania (1898) 171 U. S. 1, 18 Sup. Ct. 757.
But a statute prohibiting the sale of oleomargarine colored to resemble butter
was upheld. Plumley v. Massachusetts (1894) 155 U. S. 461, 15 Sup. Ct. 54.
Statutes prohibiting the importation of sheep or cattle actually diseased have
been sustained. Missouri, K. & T. Ry. v. Haber (1898) 169 U. S. 613, 18 Sup.
Ct. 488; Patrick v. State (i9o) 17 Wyo. 26o, 98 Pac. 588; Rouse v. Youard
(895) 1 Kan. App. 270, 41 Pac. 426. A fortiori statutes requiring inspection of
all cattle coming into the state and the dipping of those found to be infected
have been upheld. Asbell v. Kansas (i9o8) 209 U. S. 251, 28 Sup. Ct. 485;
State v. Rasmussen (xgoo) 7 Idaho, 1, 59 Pac. 933. But a statute forbidding
the sale of meat except such as had been inspected by a certain board 24 hours
before slaughter, though purporting to be a health regulation, is obviously a
discrimination against the products of other states and therefore void. Minne-
sota v. Barber (i8go) 136 U. S. 313, 1o Sup. Ct. 862. See 26 L. R. A. (N. s.)
279, note.
' Heisler v. Thomas Colliery Co. (1922) 260 U. S. 245, 43 Sup. Ct. 83; Oliver
Iron Mining Co. v. Lord (1923) 262 U. S. 172, 43 Sup. Ct. 526. The state is at
least allowed to take its toll before the product has definitely got into interstate
commerce. But see Ohio Collieries Co. v. Stewart (1923, N. D. Ohio) 290
Fed. 0oo5.
"S Hudson County Water Co. v. McCarter, supra note 6.
1" (1896) 161 U. S. 5x9, x6 Sup. Ct. 6oo.
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ground that wild animals can become the subject of ownership only in
a qualified way, and can never be the subject of commerce except with
the consent of the state and subject to the conditions which it may
deem fit to impose for the public good. Since there is no more property
in natural gas than there is in game until it is reduced to possession,15
it is hard to see, if this be good law, why a state may not also impose
the conditions under which natural gas may become the subject of
commerce. 16  The cases can doubtless be distinguished on their facts
in that, first, the collection of the gas and its transmission through the
pipes is one continuous act,17 whereas the capture and shipment of
game are disconnected; and secondly,--and the court stresses this
point-there was an established current of interstate commerce in gas
upon which consumers in Pennsylvania and Ohio had come to rely, 8
and which West Virginia, having encouraged, cannot now cut off.
But despite these distinctions, it is believed that the cases are incon-
sistent in principle and that the instant case is sounder both in theory
and in policy in refusing to allow a state to restrain the export of its
natural resources. If the interstate commerce clause, as has so often
been reiterated, was intended to make the United States a single nation
' A distinction between a state's power of control over gas and over game has
been made. The property in animals ferae naturae is in the state, whereas "as
to natural gas the public has no title to or control over gas in the ground. On
the contrary, so far as it is susceptible of ownership, it belongs to the owners
of the superincumbent lands in common, or at least such landowners have a
limited and qualified ownership in it to the entire exclusion of the public."
Manufacturers' Gas Co. v. Indiana Nat. Gas. Co., supra note 2, at p. 547, 58 N. E.
at p. 707. See also Ohio Oil Co. v. Indiana (1goo) 177 U. S. I9o, 2o Sup. Ct 576.
" This was the contention of Mr. Justice Holmes in his dissenting opinion.
It was also ably maintained by Hardman, op. cit. supra note i. The cases are
closely analogous, for in each the statute sought to protect the consuming inter-
ests of the people of the state. An attempt to protect trade interests by imposing
restrictions on the export of wild animals is clearly unconstitutional. Elner v.
Wallace (I92i, N. D. Ala.) 275 Fed. 86; (1922) 31 YALE LAw JOURNAL, 554.
iT See United Fuel Gas Co. v. Hallanan, supra note 2; Eureka Pipe Line Co. v.
Hallanan, supra note 2. Interstate commerce is a practical conception and what
falls within it must be determined upon consideration of established facts and
known commercial methods. The Pipe Line Cases (1914) 234 U. S. 548, 34
Sup. Ct. 956; Public Utilities Commission for Kansas v. London (i919) 249
U . S. 236, 39 Sup. Ct. 268.
"This is a possible ground of distinction from another case relied upon by
the dissent and stressed by Hardman, op. cit. supra note i. A New Jersey
statute prohibiting the transportation of the fresh waters of the state through
pipes into another state was enacted before such pipes had been constructed.
Hudson County Water Co. v. McCarter, supra note 6. But in spite of the fact
that the statute dealt with a situation in which no interstate traffic had begun,
and of the obvious convenience of securing the local water supply to local
consumers, this was a clear and direct regulation of interstate commerce. The
case seems anomalous. Furthermore, a similar statute has been held void where
there was no established current of interstate trade. West v. Kansas Nat. Gas.
Co., supra note 2.
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in their trade relations, it must follow that the natural resources of the
states above all should be made available to the whole country.1
9 If
the states are one nation, then there can be no reason why people who
happen to be geographically located in a particular state should have the
exclusive benefit of its peculiar natural products.
THE INTEREST OF A REMAINDERMAN IN A POLICY ISSUED TO THE
LIFE TENANT
Is a life tenant, who has collected insurance money on a fire policy
taken out by him on the property for his own benefit, entitled to the
full proceeds of the policy even above the value of his life estate, or
must he hold the amount in excess of his life interest in trust for the
remainderman? This question was raised by a recent Michigan case,
Blanchard v. Kingston (1923) 193 N. W. 241.1 Four judges agreed
with the Massachusetts view that the life tenant was entitled to the
entire proceeds of the policy,2 while four judges felt that the court was
committed by a former decision to the South Carolina doctrine that the
" See West v. Kansas Nat. Gas Co., supra note 2.
'The life tenant took out insurance on the property, and on destruction of the
premises collected the full proceeds of the policy. She then purchased four other
lots which she deeded to the plaintiff. By mistake of the scrivener, two of the lots
were left out of the deed, and this action was brought to reform the deed to
include all the lots. The life tenant having died, the remaindermen defended
claiming that all the lots belong to them, having been bought with the insurance
money which the life tenant held as trustee for the remaindermen.
'It should be noted that this discussion has to do only with the relative rights
of the life tenant and remainderman in the money after it has been finally paid by
the insurance company. It does not touch the equally interesting question of the
measure of recovery as between life tenant and the insurer. It has been strenu-
ously urged that such measure of recovery is for the full value of the property,
regardless of the value of the life estate. McClain, In-suranwe of Limited Interests
(i8g8) ii HA v. L. REv. 512, 519. This finds seeming support in the cases where
a husband as tenant by courtesy insures his wife's property and recovers for the
full value. Trade Ins. Co. v. Barradliff (883) 45 N. J. L. 543. ". . . . in most
cases the claim of the tenant from year to year cannot be answered by handing
over to him what may be the marketable value of his property and the reason is
that he insures more than the marketable value of the property, and he loses more
than the marketable value of his property; he loses the house in which he is living,
and the beneficial enjoyment of the house as well as its pecuniary value." Bowen,
L. J., in Castellain v. Preston (1883) L. M. ii Q. B. Div. 380, 400. See also
Wash. Mils Emery Mfg. Co. v. Weynwuth & Braintree Mut. Fire Ins. Co. (1883)
135 Mass. 503. But it may well be questioned whether any doctrine which allows
a plaintiff to profit by means of insurance is basically sound. Insurance should be
an indemnity against loss, rather than an instrument of profit. Hence some courts
have more soundly held that the measure of recovery is limited to the value of the
plaintiff's interest. Beeknum v. Fire Ins. Assoc. (igoi) 66 App. Div. 72, 73 N. Y.
Supp. 11o; Doyle v. Am. Fire In.s- Co. (i9o2) 18i Mass. 139, 63 N. E. 394.
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life tenant must hold the money above the value of the life estate as
trustee for the remainderman8
Although there are relatively few cases on the subject, the leading
Massachusetts case of Harison v. Pepper' undoubtedly represents the
weight of authority.5 The life tenant there insured for the full value
of the property, and was not held accountable to the remainderman for
any part of the insurance money. The court said that a contract of
insurance is a purely personal contract indemnifying the life tenant
against loss sustained by him with respect to the property, and in no
way inures to the benefit of third persons not a party to the contract.
They denied that the proceeds of the insurance in any way take the
place of the property destroyed, or that the life tenant becomes a trustee
for the remainderman. The opposing South Carolina doctrine is based
on the assumption that the insurance money does take the place of the
property destroyed, and that the life tenant becomes a trustee of that
money for the remainderman.
Both the life tenant and the remainderman have an entirely separate
insurable interest in the same property, and each may insure it to its
full value for his own benefit.7 Of course where the life tenant, under
an agreement with the remainderman, insures for the benefit of both, a
resulting trust arises.8 But where he insures solely his own interest, it
is difficult to find any basis for raising such a trust, particularly since
the life tenant is under no duty to insure in the first place. There is no
relationship between them, other than that they each have a separate
and distinct interest in a common piece of property. And as the
remainderman has an equal opportunity to insure, there is no reason
why he should profit from insurance which the life tenant has volun-
'They agreed, however, that the rule would not apply in the instant case, because
at the time the life tenant purchased the lots, she had just received a legacy of
$i,6oo, and there was no proof that she bought the lots with the insurance money
rather than with the legacy.
' (1896) 166 Mass. 288, 44 N. E. 222.
'See Spaulding v. Miller (i898) io3 Ky. 4o5, 45 S. W. 462; Bennett v. Feather-
stone (19o2) iio Tenn. 27, 7i S. W. 589; Guasen v. Whatman (i9o5, Ch.) 93
L. T. R. ioi; Sawyer v. ,dam.r (igio) I4O App. Div. 756, 126 N. Y. Supp. r8;
Addis v. Addis (i89i, N. Y. Sup. Ct) 6o Hun, 581, 14 N. Y. Supp. 657; 2 Perry,
Trusts and Trustees (4th ed. i889) sec. 553. Contra: Green v. Green (1897) 5o
S. C. 514, 27 S. E. 952; Clyburn, v. Reynolds (i889) 31 S. C. 9i, 9 S. E. 973. See
Sampson v. Grogan (1899) 21 R. I. 174, 42 AtI. 712.
'Green v. Green, supra note 5.
See Smith v. Cameron (i9og) 158 Mich. 174, 177, 122 N. W. 564, 566. "Where
no requirement is contained in the instrument creating a life estate, the life tenant
is not bound to insure the interest of the remainderman-als'o, that either party
may insure for his own benefit" See also 2 Perry, loc. cit. supra note 5.
' Welsh v. London Assur. Corp. (1892) i51 Pa. 6o7, 25 At. i4z; Convis v.
Citizens Mut. Fire Ins. Co. (19o) 17 Mich. 616, 86 N. W. 994. See Smith v.
Cameron, supra note 7. While these cases are frequently cited to uphold the trust
theory where the life tenant insures for himself alone, they can hardly be con-
sidered as authority for that proposition.
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tarily taken out.' It is true that in the vendor-vendee cases there is a
growing tendency to hold the vendor as a trustee of the insurance money
for the vendee.' 0 But there is already a trust relationship existing
between the two in other respects,1 and it is consequently easier for the
courts to imply it in the case of insurance money. In the case of a life
tenant and remainderman, however, there is no such relationship in any
respect.
Whether or not the proceeds of a policy of insurance take the place
of the property insured, depends .on what is the true nature of a
contract of insurance. Brett, L. J., in Raynwr v. Preston,'2 pointed out
a distinction between the subject matted of the insurance and the subject
matter of the contract of insurance. By this he meant that the per-
formance of the contract in no way touches or concerns the physical
property. The contract is not appurtenant to the land, but is merely an
aleatory contract to pay upon the happening of an event,-a personal
contract between the insurer and another for indemnity against possible
loss with respect to certain property.13  Upon the happening of the loss,
the money is still the subject matter of the contract and is in no true
sense substituted for the subject matter of the insurance, i. e. the
property.14 This is clearly borne out by the vendor-vendee cases where
the vendee, though he is still under a duty to pay the price, receives no
benefit from the insurance taken out by the vendor. 15 Likewise where
'A trust relationship exists between co-tenants under certain circumstances, yet
the South Carolina court held in a previous case, Annely v. De Saussure (1887) 26
S, C. 497, 2 S. E. 490, that this does not apply to the case of insurance taken out
by one for his own benefit. To thereafter hold in a similar situation that a life
tenant is trustee for a remainderman seems inconsistent.
" Mattingly v. Springfield Fire & Marine Ins. Co. (19o4) 12o Ky. 768, 83 S. W.
577; Skinner & Sons Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. Houghton (igoo) 92 Md.
68, 48 Atl. 85. Russell v. Elliott (1922) 45 S. D. 184, 186 N. W. 824. For a
discussion of this point see (1922) 6 MiNN. L. REv. 607. Contra: see infra note
15. It is interesting to note that this has been made the rule under the new
English Property Act of 1922, 12 & 13 Geo. V, c. 16, see. 105.
' The vendor is already a quasi-trustee in the sense that on tender of the
purchase price a court of equity will compel the vendor to convey to the vendee.
'" (1881) L. R. 18 Ch. Div. 1, 9.
"It is not a contract limiting or affecting the interest of the vendors in the
property... It is not even a contract in the event of fire to repair the buildings,
but a contract in that event to pay the vendor a sum of money, which if received
by them they may apply in any way they see fit." Cotton, L. J., in Rayner v.
Preston, supra note 12, at p. 6.
14 "It cannot be said that the money on the policy stands in place of the property
destroyed. It is in no proper or just sense the proceeds of the policy. It is a
sum paid by the insurer in consideration of a certain premium, as an indemnity for
the loss of property in which the insured has a legal and insurable interest. This
indemnity cannot be taken away by setting up a contingent right or title in third
persons in the property in which the insured had a valid insurable interest at the
time of the loss." Lerow v. Wiliarth (1864, Mass.) 9 Allen, 382, 385.
"Rayner v. Preston, supra note 12; King v. Preston (1856) II La. Ann. 95.
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a mortgagee insures, the contract is purely personal and is not in any
way affected by the collateral mortgage contract with the mortgagor
whose debt still remains unpaid. 6 It is true that the South Carolina
court cites several cases where apparently the money is substituted for
the property. Thus where a testator, having insured certain property,
dies leaving it to a life tenant with remainder over, upon total loss both
the life tenant and the reversioner are entitled to their relative shares of
the money.' 7  But there it is presumed the testator intended to benefit
both when he took out the policy, and while in result the proceeds of the
policy were substituted for the land, in reality the court was merely
carrying out the testator's intention. In general 8 it seems that the
sound view is to consider the insurance money simply as an indemnity
for the loss sustained, rather than a substitution for the property lost.
There thus seems to be little or no basis for the South Carolina
doctrine. The life tenant is merely indemnified on a personal contract
with the insurer for what he has lost-his dwelling house-which to him
may represent the whole estate. The fact that he may collect more than
the value of his life estate is a matter between himself and the insurer,
And see White v. Gihna (19o3) 138 Calif. 375, 71 Pac. 436, where it is similarly
held that the vendor has no interest in insurance taken out by the vendee. As a
sequence of the doctrine of Rayner v. Preston, it is held that the insurance company
is subrogated to the vendor's right to the purchase price. Castellain. v. Preston,
supra note 2. But those courts that have denied the doctrine of Rayner v. Preston
naturally deny the right of subrogation. Skinner & Sons Dry Dock Co. v.
Houghton, supra note I0. The basis of these latter cases is that the vendor is a
trustee for the vendee, and not that the insurance money is substituted for the land.
On the general subject, see (1921) 27 CoL. L. R-v. 6oi.
"Burlingaine v. Goodspeed (1891) 153 Mass. 24, 26 N. E. 232; Dunbrach v.
Neall (19o4) 55 W. Va. 565, 47 S. E. 3o3; International Trust Co. v. Boardnan
(1889) 149 Mass. 158, 21 N. E. 239. And similarly, where a mortgagor insures
his interest, the mortgagee has no claim to the benefits of the policy. Col. Ins. Co.
v. Lawrence (1836, U. S.) IO Pet. 507; Plimpton v. Farmers Mit. Fire Ins. Co.
(1871) 43 Vt. 497. Where the mortgagee insures, the insurance company is
entitled to be subrogated to the mortgage debt which still remains due. Gillespie
v. Scottish Union Ins. Co. (19o6) 61 W. Va. i69, 56 S. E. 213; II L. R. A. (17. s.)
143, note. In Massachusetts, no subrogation is allowed, and the mortgagee.may
collect both the insurance and the mortgage debt. Suffolk Fire Ins. Co. v. Boyden
(1864, Mass.) 9 Allen, 123.
1" That is, the life tenant to the income for life, and the reversioner to the
principal after his death. Haxall's Ex'r v. Shippen. (1839, Va.) io Leigh, 536;
Graham v. Roberts (1851) 43 N. C. 99; Cuelbertson v. Cox (1882) 29 Minn. 309,
13 N. W. 177. But where there is only partial loss, it is the right of either to have
the money applied to rebuilding. Brough v. Higgins (1846, Va.) 2 Gratt 408.
See (1921) 21 CoL. L. REv. 491.
" There are a few other cases that tend to support the South Carolina view.
Thus where property insured by a testator during his lifetime burns, the right of
action rests in the administrator, but the proceeds come into his hands as realty
and must go to the heirs. Wyman v. Wymra* (1863) 26 N. Y. 253. See also
People's St. Ry. Co. v. Specer (1893) 156 Pa. 85, 27 Atl. 113; In re RobI's Estate
(1912) 163 Calif. 8oi, 127 Pac. 55.
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in which the remainderman has no interest. There is no reason in law
or in public policy why he should be deprived of the full benefits of his
insurance which he had been foresighted enough to take out,19 and the
instant case in so holding has adopted the sounder view.
THE EFFECT OF STATE STATUTES ON EQUITY JURISDICTION IN THE
FEDERAL COURTS
The Supreme Court of the United States has early said that the
jurisdiction of the courts of the United States in equity can not be
impaired by the laws of the states,' and somewhat later that the legisla-
ture of a state cannot directly enlarge the equitable jurisdiction 2 of a
federal court.3 To the former rule there seems to be no exception.
Federal courts of equity will not entertain suits where there is a plain,
adequate, and complete remedy at law in their own tribunal;4 but a
federal court will act, in a case otherwise proper, even though a state
" Nor is the life tenant morally bound, for he is under no legal duty to restore
the destroyed premises. See Rogers v. Atlantic Co. (I95) 213 N. Y. 246, io7
N. E. 661. It seems that the Michigan court was not committed to the South
Carolina doctrine by the Cameron case, supra note 7, for the reason given by
Wiest, J., that it went off on the finding that the insurance was taken out for the
benefit of both the remainderman and the life tenant, and hence is not a direct
holding on the point.
'Payne v. Hook (1868, U. S.) 7 Wall. 425. See Dodge v. Tulleys (z892) 144
U. S. 451, 12 Sup. Ct. 78.
'In this connection one should distinguish carefully the two uses of the word
jurisdiction. "While jurisdiction, in its proper sense, means authority to hear
and decide a cause, it is common to speak of jurisdiction in equity or the juris-
diction of a court of equity as not relating to the power of the court to hear and
determine a cause, but as to whether it ought to assume the jurisdiction and hear
and decide the cause . . . . 'We often find the jurisdiction denied where the
power exists but ought not to be exercised, and in this sense is the word 'juris-
diction' usually used when applied to courts of chancery. Where there is want
of power the decree is void collaterally, but where there is said to be a want of
jurisdiction, merely, it is only meant that it would be erroneous to exercise the
power and the decree would be reversed on appeal. It means a want of equity
and not a want of power.'" Miller v. Rowan (1n) 251 Ill. 344, 348, 96 N. E.
285, 287. Where a court has jurisdiction in the strict sense disobedience and
resistance to its order is a criminal contempt People v. McKane (1894, Sup.
Ct.) 78 Hun, I54, 28 N. Y. Supp. 981. A court will entertain an objection to
jurisdiction in the strict sense at any stage of the case, but objection to "equitable
jurisdiction" must be raised by demurrer or plea or be distinctly stated in the
defendants' answer. i Beach, Modern Practice in Equity (1894) ch. i, secs. 13
and i4; Waterloo Mining Co. v. Doe (1897, C. C. A. 9th) 82 Fed. 45. Where
a court says that a state law cannot give jurisdiction to a federal court but may
give a substantial right which will be enforced in a federal court, jurisdiction
in the strict sense is meant. Ex pare McNiel (1871, U. S.) 13 Wall. 236.
'Reynolds v. Crawfordsville Bank (1884) 112 U. S. 405, 5 Sup. Ct. 213.
"Act of March 3, 1911 (36 Stat. at L. 1163) ; Fenn v. Holte (1858, U. S.) 21
How. 481; Whitehead v. Shattuck (i8gi) 138 U. S. 146, 1I Sup. Ct 276.
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statute gives a complete and adequate remedy at law in the state court.
5
Not even can a state law expressly forbidding a suit in equity under
certain circumstances, bar a suit in equity in the courts of the United
States.' But where the state law provides for an enlargement of
equitable rights, the federal courts will in the exercise of their already
existing powers enforce the rights thus created. In enforcing these
new equitable rights created by state statutes the federal courts are
limited only by the Constitution.7 Thus legal and equitable actions may
not be united in the federal courts,8 especially where such blending of
actions would deprive a litigant of his constitutional right to a trial by
jury.
Pusey and Jones v. Hanssen (1923, U. S.) 43 Sup. Ct. 454, involved
'Fenn v. Holme, supra note 4; United States v. Howland (i819, U. S.) 4
Wheat. io8; Boyle v. Zacharie (1832, U. S.) 6 Pet. 648; McConihay v. Wright
(1887) 121 U. S. 201, 7 Sup. Ct. 940. "Conceding it to be true .... that the
full relief sought in this suit could be obtained in the state courts in an action
at law, it does not follow that the Federal court, sitting as a court of equity,
is without jurisdiction. The inquiry rather is, whether by the principles of
common law and equity, as distinguished and defined in this and the mother
country at the time o~f the adoption of the Constitution of the United 'States,
the relief here sought was one obtainable in a court of law, or one which only
a court of equity was fully competent to give." Mississippi Mills v. Cohn (1893)
I5o U. S. 202, 205, 14 Sup. Ct. 75, 76. The state statute cannot be pleaded to
abate a suit in equity in a federal court. Suydan v. Broadnax (184o, U. S.)
14 Pet. 67; Union Bank v. Jolly's Adm'rs (1855, U. S.) 18 How. 503; Green's
Adm'x v. Creighton (1850, U. S.) 23 How. go. But see Williams v. Benedict
(I85O, U. S.) 8 How. io7; Peale v. Phipps (1852, U. S.) 14 How. 368.
'Guffey v. Smith (1915) 237 U. S. 101, 35 Sup. Ct. 526. Statements of courts,
that a party loses nothing by going into a federal tribunal and that he has a
choice of tribunals, are then not strictly true. See Ex parte McNiel, supra note
2; Davis v. Gray (1872, U. S.) 16 Wall. 203; Suydam v. Broadnax, supra note 5.
'Scott v. Neely (i8gi) i4O U. S. io6, ii Sup. Ct. 712.
8 "The judicial power shall extend to all cases, in law and equity...." 1U. S.
Const. Art III, sec. 2; Livingston v. Story (1835, U. S.) 9 Pet 632;
Bennett v. Butterworth (185o, U. S.) ii How. 669. The acts of Congress on
this question were similarly construed. "By the 34th section of the judiciary
act of 1789, it is provided, that the laws of the several states .... shall be
regarded as rules of decision in trials at common law in the courts of the
United States in cases where they apply. The Act of May, 1792, confirms the
modes of proceeding then used in suits at common law in the courts of the
United States, and declares that the modes of proceeding in suits of equity
shall be, 'according to the principles, rules, and usages, which belong to courts
of equity, as contra-distinguished from courts of common law' . . . . The
court .... think, that to effectuate the purposes of the legislature, the remedies
in the courts of the United States are to be, at common law or in equity, not
according to the practice of state courts, but according to the principles of
common law and equity as distinguished and defined in that country from which
we derive our knowledge of those principles." Robinson v. Campbell (i818,
U. S.) 3 Wheat. 212, 221.
9 "In suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty
dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved." U. S. Const. Amend.
VII (79); Thompson v. R. R. (1867, U. S.) 6 Wall. 134; Whitehead v.
Shattuck, supra note 4.
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a Delaware statute which provided that, "Whenever a corporation shall
be insolvent, the Chancellor, on the application and for the benefit of
any creditor .... may .... appoint .... receivers of and for such
corporation... ." A simple contract creditor of an insolvent corpora-
tion filed a bill in a federal court praying that a receiver be appointed
for the corporation. Receivers were appointed; but the Supreme
Court, two judges dissenting, reversed the decree of appointment for
lack of jurisdiction. The court distinguished this case from others
where they had enforced state statutes creating hew equitable rights by
saying that here only a remedial right in equity is given while the
statute in the other cases changed a rule of substantive law.
It is believed that analysis will show there is ambiguity in the use of
the word remedial in connection with a right. In the instant case, the
court uses the term as if it were synonymous with adjective or
procedural as distinguished from substantive. But a remedial right
may be either substantive or adjective. Thus, the question whether
in a given case a plaintiff is entitled only to damages or may recover
property specifically is obviously substantive and not procedural,
although it has to do with remedies. A remedial substantive right given
by a state statute will be enforced in the federal courts while a remedial
adjective right will not be. A statute which allows a suit in equity to
accomplish a result which could be attained by an action at law gives a
remedial adjective right, and its enforcement would deprive the litigant
of his constitutional right to a trial by jury in the law action.10 A
statute which allows a suit in equity to accomplish a result which, except
for the statute, could not be attained either at law or equity, creates a
new substantive right or enlarges an old one and in so doing is giving a
substantive remedial right. The distinction is clear in the cloud on title
cases. Where the statute allows relief in equity to quiet title, and under
the same circumstances, an action of ejectment accomplishing substan-
tially the same purpose lies at law, the statute confers only a remedial
procedural right;"1 but where the statute gives relief in equity under
circumstances where no action at law would lie, the right given is
substantive although remedial. 12
Perhaps there is less certainty where the statute grants relief which
may not be obtained at law but which would do away with the need for
common law relief. For example, if a statute were to allow a suit for
the specific performance of a contract under circumstances where it had
not been granted before, would this deprive the litigant of his right to a
trial by jury in the suit for damages for breach of the contract? 1 3 It is
10 Since it is a question of constitutionality this is also true of a federal statute.
"Whitehead v. Shattuck, supra note 4; McConihay v. Wright, supra note 5.
"Holland v. Challen, (1884) HO U. S. 15, 3 Sup. Ct. 495; Reynolds v. Craw-
fordsville Bank, supra note 3; Clark v. Smith (1839, U. S.) 13 Pet. 195. See
also Bodley v. Taylor (18o9, U. S.) 5 Cranch, 191; Lewis v. Marshall (1831,
U. S.) 5 Pet. 470.
" Is there anything in the Constitution of the United States which forbids the
extension of the right to specific performance in the federal courts?
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submitted that the relief allowed by the statute would be so different
from the relief at law that it would not be unconstitutional for the
federal courts to enforce the statute. 4
Several years before the instant case the Circuit Court for Delaware
declared that the statute here involved created a new substantive right
in equity.' 5 In a recent ease' 6 the Delaware Chancellor has, with what
seem persuasive arguments, disagreed directly with the majority in the
Hanssen case.'7  He said, "..... the Delaware statute does something
more than to create simply an equitable remedy. It . . . creates a
substantive right of a clearly equitable nature. The right which this
statute creates is not .... defined in terms. It is to be gathered ....
from what appears to be the evident and manifest purpose of the statute.
That right .... is that the assets of a corporation upon the event of
insolvency may be regarded by creditors and stockholders as impressed
with somewhat of the nature of a trust to be administered for their
benefit. . . . The appointment of the receiver is not the final relief.
Such appointment is only ancillary to the primary relief, which is to
protect and preserve and ultimately dispose of the corporate assets in
harmony with the conception that the statute has conferred upon the
classes named a right to have the assets impressed with a beneficial
interest common-to all.'
8
It seems that the View here guggested is sound; that the statute
creates a substantive right, one which is clearly equitable and does not
exist at law, and one which, therefore, it would not be unconstitutional
for the federal courts to enforce.
THE FATE OF THE KANSAS INDUSTRIAL COURT
In the recent case of Wolff Packing Co. v. Court of Industrial Rela-
tions of Kansas' (1923, U. S.) 43 Sup. Ct..630, where for the first
' 4 n the Mississippi statute construed in Scott v. Neely, supra note 7, and in
Cates v. Allen (1893) 149 U. S. 451, 13 Sup. Ct. 883, the chancellor was given
jurisdiction of bills of creditors who had not obtained judgments at law to set
aside fraudulent conveyances of property or other devices resorted to for the
purpose of defrauding creditors. As the relief granted by the statute invested
the parties with a substantial right which they did not have at law, as suggested
by the dissenting opinion in Cates v. Allen, supra, perhaps it would have been
permissible for the federal court to have enforced the statute.
' lones v. Mutual Fidelity Co. (1903, C. C. D. Del.) 123 Fed. 506.
"6Mackenzie Oil Co. v. Onzar Oil & Gas. Co. (1923, Del. Ch.) 120o At. 852.
'Although suggesting a possible interpretation of its own state statute this
decision has, of course, no effect on the United States courts. Neves v. Scott
(1851, U. S.) 13 How. 268; Russell v. Southard (1851, U. S.) 12 How. 139.
'Mackenzie Oil Co. v. Omar Oil Co., supra note i6, at p. 856. The judge
further said at p. 857, "The fact that there is discretion in the chancellor to
refuse to appoint a receiver .... does not seem to me to destroy the right
given by the statute any more than it could be said that the discretion which
equity always exercises in administering the remedy of specific performance
strips the right which underlies the remedy of its equitable character."
'The case was on appeal from the Supreme Court of Kansas. Court of
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time2 the question of the constitutionality of the Kansas Industrial
Court Act 3 was squarely presented, it was held by a unanimous court
that the Act "in so far as it permits the fixing of wages in plaintiff in
error's packing house is in conflict with the Fourteenth Amendment,
and deprives it of its property and liberty of contract without due
process of law."4  Two important questions are raised by this decision:
What businesses are properly the subject for state regulation, and to
what extent will such regulation be permitted in a proper case?
It is undoubtedly true that a business affected with a public interest
is subject to state regulation. In the course of his opinion, Chief Justice
Taft divides such businesses into three classes: (i) Those which have
received a special privilege from the state, such as railroads and public
utilities. (2) Certain exceptional occupations, such as innkeeping,
which have been regulated since the early days of English history.
(3) Businesses which have come to be affected with a public interest
because of the "indispensable nature of the service and the exorbitant
charges and arbitrary control to which the public might be subjected
without regulation." The grain elevator cases are illustrations of the
last group.5 This classification involves a consideration of the origin
of the peculiar public service duties,6 and prompts one to consider the
Industrial Relations v. Wolff Packing Co. (1921) iog Kan. 629, 2oi Pac. 418;
(1922) 111 Kan. 501, 2o7 Pac. 8o6. For a further discussion of these cases, see
(1921) 31 YALE LAW JoURNAL, 206; (I922) 31 ibid. 450.
'The case of Howat v. Kansas (1922) 258 U. S. 18I, 42 Sup. Ct. 277 did not
present a federal question. See CoMMENTS (1921) 31 YALE LAW J ORNAL, 75;
(1922) 31 ibid. 889. See also Vance, The Kansas Court of Industrial Relations
and Its Background (1921) 3o ibid. 456.
'Kan. Spec. Sess. Laws, 192o, ch. 29, created the Court. The Act is given
fully as a note to State v. Howat (1921) 198 Pac. 686, 705. The purpose of the
act set out in sec. 6 is to compel continuity in the food, clothing, and fuel indus-
tries which are declared to be affected with a public interest in sec. 3. Sec. 7
gives the court power, in the event of an industrial controversy which "may
endanger the continuity or efficiency of service of any of said industries," to
investigate the controversy and fix the "terms and conditions upon which said
industry should be thereafter conducted . . . ." The court is empowered by
sec. 8 to order changes "in the matters of working and living conditions, hours
of labor, rules, and practices, and a reasonable minimum wage. . .-. " Sec. 17
virtually forbids the workmen to strike, though it recognizes a privilege in the
individual to quit work at any time.
'The court did not find it necessary to pass on sec. 3 of the Act which declares
the designated businesses to be affected with a public interest. 'We are relieved
from considering and deciding definitely whether preparation of food should be
put in the third class of quasi-public businesses .... because, even so, the valid
regulation to which it might be subjected as such, could not include what this
Act attempts." 43 Sup. Ct. at p. 634.
'JMunn v. Illinois (1876) 94 U. S. 113; Budd v. New York (1892) 143 U. S.
517, 12 Sup. Ct. 468; Brass v. North Dakota (1894) 153 U. S. 391, 14 Sup. Ct. 857.
'These duties are as follows: the duty to serve all, and furnish adequate
facilities, at a reasonable rate, without discrimination. Able writers have given
their theory of the genesis of these duties. See Wyman, The Law of Public
Callings as a Solution to the Trust Problem (1904) 17 HARv. L. Rav. 156, 217;
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nature of a public calling both at early common law and in the light of
recent decisions.
According to Professor Bruce Wyman, 7 the public character of a
business at common law depended on its control of a virtual monopoly
and on its importance to the public. Veterinary surgeons in the early
days of England were few in number; this was also true of common
carriers and farriers.8 Consequently, because of their importance to the
public, persons engaged in these callings were under a legal duty to
serve all who applied and for a reasonable compensation. Mr. Wyman
attempts, to show with respect to businesses in classes (i) and (3) that
conditions are not usually competitive but monopolistic, and that because
of this and because of their importance to the public, they are properly
charged with public service duties.'
Professor C. K. Burdick, however, adopts a different view. Accord-
ing to him, anyone who held himself out as ready to serve all owed a
duty to serve all and for a reasonable price. The determining factor
was not the kind of business, but the manner in which it was carried on.
One who was engaged in a common calling and refused to serve, or
failed to use due care in serving, committed a breach of his general
assumpsit to serve all.Y0 But Professor Burdick agrees that Mr.
Wyman's monopoly test should determine the businesses to be included
in the class of quasi-public businesses (class 3). This test has, how-
ever, been rejected by the United States Supreme Court in Brass v.
North Dakota,. where the importance of grain-elevating to the public was
the only basis for upholding a statute fixing prices for the storing of
Burdick, Origin of the Peculiar Duties of Public Service Companies (1911) I1
CoL L. REv. 514, 616, 743; Adler, Business Jurisprudence (1914) 28 HARv. L.
REv. 135.
'See Wyman, op. cit. supra note 6.
... the farriers were so scattered that the conditions were those of
virtual monopoly, which required therefore a special code, else a good horse
might be ruined for want of a shoe if the wayside smith should take it into his
head to refuse to serve." Wyman, op. cit. supra note 6, at p. 158.
As to class (2) it is said (Wyman, op. cit. supra note 6, at p. 222) ".... no
business can be granted a privilege under our constitutional system unless it is a
public calling." We have already seen what Prof. Wyman's test of such a
calling is. And as to class (3) : "In these cases of the grain elevator and the
stockyard, experience shows us that in a given community there are not usually
competitive conditions; monopolistic conditions generally prevail." Wyman,
op. cit. sgpra note 6, at p. 225. The monopoly theory was adopted in COMMENTS
(1918) 27 YAE LAw JouRAx, 824, 828. This test was however rejected by the
United States Supreme Court in the Brass case, supra note 5.
10 "But in fact it seems .... that the position of one who is engaged in a common
calling and refuses to serve an applicant is quite distinguishable from that of the
carpenter who promises to build a house and does not do so. The former has
in fact entered upon the general undertaking of a common calling, while the
carpenter has entered upon no undertaking, and when the former refuses to
serve he is not really refusing to enter upon an undertaking as the carpenter is,
but is refusing to perform the public undertaking already entered upon."
Burdick, op. cit. supra note 6, at p. 517.
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grain.1- Mr. Burdick does not accept Professor Wyman's views of the
businesses in class (i) .12
The most far reaching and yet it seems the soundest view is that of
Mr. Edward A. Adler. He agrees with Professor Burdick on the
nature of a public business at common law, but going further he says :1"
"Under a true interpretation of the common law, all business is public,
and the phrase 'private business' is a contradiction in terms. Whatever
is private is not business, and that which is business is not private.
Every man engaged in business is engaged in a public profession and a
public calling. The parties to business are the merchants on the one
hand and the public on the other. The merchant or trader opens his
doors into the public street and invites all who pass to enter. By public
advertising and circularizing he solicits patronage from all who read.
He extends an invitation or makes a continuing offer to all indifferently.
He seeks credit, employs the machinery of credit, and by so doing
involves the fortunes of the community at large."
Thus the manner in which a business is carried on is the important
factor. Mr. Adler's test is wide enough to subject any business to
legislative control according to the prevailing views of social policy
and expediency. And indeed it seems that in early days there was no
limit to the number of businesses subject to public service duties.' 4 It
is true that with the increase of inventions and the spread of the laissez
faire idea, the state in fact ceased to exercise a broad regulatory power,
but it does not follow that it has lost this power it once possessed. On
the other hand, as our social organization becomes more complex and
more regulation is found to be necessary, a broader exercise of the
regulatory power is to be expected. This is well illustrated by the
increasing number of businesses which have been subjected to state
regulation since the end of the nineteenth century,-regulations which
the United States Supreme Court has sustained in spite of vigorous
contentions that the Fourteenth Amendment was violated.' 5 It was the
I See supra note 9; Wyman, op. cit. supra note 6, at p. 746.
.C,... it would seem that .... the potential general usefulness of an
undertaking to the members of the community justifies the grant of the power
of eminent domain .... and the acceptance of such a grant carries with it the
duty to use such powers reasonably and impartially for the benefit of all appli-
cants." Burdick, op. cit. supra note 6, at p. 629.
"Adler, op. cit. supra note 6, at p. 158. In note 8o Mr. Adler points out that
the German Commercial Code requires "the registration of traders as such."
"4 See Adler, op. cit. supra note 6, at p. 149.
'Some of the decisions referred to beside the grain elevator cases are: Noble
State Bank v. Haskell (1911) 219 U. S. 104, 31 Sup. Ct. 186 (statute regulating
banking business); German Alliance Ins. Co. v. Lewis (1914) 233 U. S. 389,
34 Sup. Ct 612 (regulation of insurance rates); Block v. Hirsh (1921) 256
U. S. 135, 41 Sup. Ct. 458 (statute regulating rents) ; Muller v. Oregon (1go8)
2o8 U. S. 412, 28 Sup. Ct. 324 (statute regulating hours of labor) ; Bunting v.
Oregon (1917) 243 U. S. 426, 37 Sup. Ct. 435 (same). "Many of the recent
cases seem to reflect what may be called an attitude of judicial self-denial or
laissez faire, a willingness on the part of the courts to regard the legislative
determination that social and economic conditions demand statutory regulation
as a conclusive determination with which the courts will interfere only in
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importance of grain elevating to the public that determined the decision
in the Brass case and not the fact of monopoly. And it is submitted
that the food, clothing, and fuel industries, designated by the Kansas
Court for regulation, may well be included in class (3) as businesses
affected with a public interest.16
The decision of the instant case however forbids regulation which
consists in fixing wages on the ground that it is violative of the
Fourteenth Amendment. 7  In view of the recent case holding unconsti-
tutional the minimum wage law for women, such a decision was perhaps
to be expected.' 8 But the Act in question was not a price-fixing statute.
The Kansas Act' 9 imposed on the owners of the industries it affected
the duty of operating their plants "with reasonable continuity. '20 And
cases of the most obvious and palpable abuse of discretion .... The proper
sphere of legislative regulation of social and economic conditions ceases to be
defined in accordance with judicial tests of reasonableness and becomes, to use
the words of Prof. Vance, 'substantially commensurate with the considered
legislative policy of the state.'" Cushman, Social and Economic Interpretation
of the Fourteenth Amendment (1922) 2o MicH. L. REV. 737, 758.
"The industries named in the Kansas Act produce the necessaries of life.
The preparation of food or clothing may not present as strong a case as the
mining of coal; but it seems that, under the decisions of the Supreme Court in
general and th'e Brass case in particular, there is no constitutional objection to
a state statute which would regulate the prices of products of any of the
designated industries.
' The Supreme Court of Kansas in upholding the validity of the act said:
"If the state can make regulations for the government of a business affected
with a public interest, it ought to be able to extend that regulation to the wages
paid to the employees of that business. The flow of food supply from producer
to consumer should not be stopped by conditions produced by industrial unrest
arising out of wage problems. If that flow is threatened and the state under its
police power can remove the danger that should be done. That and that alone
the Kansas industrial court law attempts to do." Court of Industrial Relations
v. Wolff Packing Gb. (192i) iog Kan. 629, 646, 201 Pac. 418, 426. Indeed whether
the regulation be of prices or of wages, in either case the profits and returns
of the business are limited. It may also be remarked that hours of labor statutes
inevitably affect wages. See especially Bunting v. Oregon cted supra note 15,
where the contention was made that the statute in question was a wage statute.
Cf. the principal case with Wilson v. New (97) 243 U. S. 330, 37 Sup. Ct. 298,
where the Supreme Court upheld an Act of Congress prescribing a minimum
wage, which act was passed to avert a nation-wide railroad strike.
'Adkins v. Children's Hospital (1923, U. S.) 43 Sup. Ct. 394; COMMENTs
(923) 32 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 829.
'Sec. 6.
Compare with the following from Munn v. Illinois (1876) 94 U. S. 113, 126:
"Property does become clothed with a public interest when used in a manner
to make it of public consequence and affect the community at large. When,
therefore, one devotes his property to a use in which the public has an interest,
he in effect grants to the public an interest in that use, and must submit to be
controlled by the public for the common good to the extent of the interest he
has thus created. He may withdraw his grant by discontinuing the use; but
so long as he maintains the use, he must submit to the control." As to the
privilege of a public utility to withdraw from service, see COMMENTS (1922)
32 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 75.
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it also imposed on the owners a duty to pay prescribed wages as a means
of attaining such a continuity. The aim of the latter provision was to
eliminate the strike as an obstacle to continuous operations. As a
substitute the Kansas Industrial Court was created with power to settle
controversies between employer and employee. No great emergency was
necessary before the court could act. It was admitted that the plant
involved in the instant case was a small one, and "if it should cease to
operate, the effect on the supply of meat and food in this state would
not greatly inconvenience the people of Kansas."121  Nevertheless, a
majority of the Supreme Court of Kansas held that "such an emergency
as. the law contemplates existed.
2 2
Now that the power to fix wages as a means of insuring continuous
operation in industries affected with a public interest has been denied
to the state legislature,2 3 whatever usefulness the Kansas Court of
Industrial Relations had in the solution of social problems incident to
industrial unrest, has been practically destroyed.2 4  The Kansas Act
was indeed far reaching in its scope. Yet similar legislation has been
enacted in Australia and New Zealand ;25 and statutes regulating wages
as well as prices of commodities are not unknown in English and
American history.28  These statutes were enacted to relieve from
economic distresses and "to secure to the people those commodities
which were deemed by the legislative branch of the government to be of
prime necessity for the existence or for the comfort and convenience of
the body politic." 27 The Supreme Court, however, was not prepared to
follow the Kansas legislature in the adoption of wage-fixing as the next
step in the modem development of state regulation.
'Court of Industrial Relations v. Wolff Packing Co. (1922) III Kan. 5oi,
502, 207 Pac. 8o6, 8o7.
"Ibid.
"The employer is bound by this act to pay the wages fixed and while the
worker is not required to work, at the wages fixed, he is forbidden, on penalty
of fine or imprisonment, to strike against them and thus is compelled to give
up that means of putting himself on an equality with his employer which action
in concert with his fellows gives him." From the opinion of Chief Justice Taft.
The original proceedings against the Wolff Company were in mnandanus to
compel it to establish hours of labor as well as to put into effect a schedule of
wages as ordered by the Industrial Court. The power to fix hours of labor
was not discussed in the principal case. See the discussion of this matter by the
Supreme Court of Kansas in Court of Industrial Relations v. Wolff Packing Co.
(1921) io9 Kan. 629, 641, 201 Pac. 418, 424. Cf. with the Muller and Bunting
cases cited supra note 1S.
"' Cf. sec. 28 of the Act: "If any section or provision of this act shall be
found invalid by any court, it shall be conclusively presumed that this act would
have been passed by the Legislature without such invalid section or provision,
and the act as a whole shall not be declared invalid by reason of the fact that
one or more sections or provisions may'be found to be invalid by any court."
See (1921) 31 YArz LAW JOURNAL, 206.
See Gilmore, Governmental Regulation of Prices (i9o5) 27 GREEN BAG, 627;
and, for example, Conn. Sess. Laws, 1778, at p. 485.
' Gilmore, op. cit. supra note 26, at p. 631.
